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Rogue Trading at Lloyds Bank International,
1974: Operational Risk in Volatile Markets
Rogue trading has been a persistent feature of international
ﬁnancialmarkets over the past thirty years, but there is remark-
ably little historical treatment of this phenomenon. To begin to
ﬁll this gap, evidence from company and ofﬁcial archives is used
to expose the anatomy of a rogue trading scandal at LloydsBank
International in 1974. The rush to internationalize, the conﬂict
between rules and norms, and the failure of internal and exter-
nal checks all contributed to the largest single loss of any British
bank to that time. The analysis highlights the dangers of incon-
sistent norms and rules evenwhen personal ﬁnancial gain is not
the main motive for fraud, and shows the important links
between operational and market risk. This scandal had an
important role in alerting the Bank of England and U.K. Trea-
sury to gaps in prudential supervision at the end of the
Bretton Woods pegged exchange-rate system.
The persistent vulnerability of major ﬁnancial institutions to roguetrading is clear from the repeated episodes of this form of fraud, par-
ticularly since the globalization of the 1990s. This article examines a
scandal from 1974, when Lloyds Bank suffered the largest loss to date
of any British bank by a single speculator. It shows how the cozy relation-
ship between bankers and their regulators that had developed behind
capital controls and uncompetitive markets was challenged by the col-
lapse of the pegged exchange-rate system, acceleration of international
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ﬁnancial innovation, inﬂation, and a heady atmosphere of international-
ization. Increased competition prompted aggressive expansion into new
markets by managers inexperienced in assessing both market and oper-
ational risk and thus vulnerable to a mismatch between the norms of
banking in Switzerland and those in the City of London.
By rogue trading we mean a particular type of operational failure
that arises when a trader hides large losses from managers by illegally
evading disclosure regulations. Several special characteristics distin-
guish rogue trading from other forms of fraud where the initial intention
is to steal from the company or its customers.1 First, it is revealed only
when the losses reach a point where they can no longer be concealed,
so it is difﬁcult to gauge how prevalent this behavior is. Secondly, the
motivation is not always primarily personal ﬁnancial gain, but rather
the protection of reputation, which raises issues about the norms of
ﬁnancial markets.
Rogue traders have been variously depicted as charismatic heroes,
aberrations in an otherwise well-functioning market, and the products of
systemic biases that promote or condone their actions.2 The legal and eco-
nomic literature focuses on internal supervisory and compliance mecha-
nisms, while social or psychosocial perspectives focus on personal
incentives for individual staff to achieve high proﬁts. Given the probability
of “successful” rogues creating proﬁts by taking risks, incentives such as
bonusesmay encouragenormswhere some transgressionof rules is accept-
able. As MarkWexler notes, “There has not been a case where a trader has
been labelled a roguewhenmakingmoney for theﬁrm.”3Rogue trading can
1There is a large historical literature on corporate fraud, including Jerry Markham, A
Financial History of Modern U.S. Corporate Scandals: From Enron to Reform (Abingdon,
U.K., 2006); and David Sama, History of Greed: Financial Fraud from Tulip Mania to
Bernie Madoff (Hoboken, N.J., 2010). These accounts rely mainly on newspapers, interviews,
or court cases, and not on internal archival evidence, although there are exceptions for earlier
periods, such as James Taylor, Boardroom Scandal: The Criminalization of Company Fraud
in Nineteenth-Century Britain (Oxford, 2013); and Matthew Hollow, Rogue Banking: A
History of Financial Fraud in Interwar Britain (London, 2015). But little historical literature
speciﬁcally addresses rogue trading. Autobiographies of rogue traders include Toshihide
Iguchi, My Billion Dollar Education: Inside the Mind of a Rogue Trader (Tokyo, 2014);
David Bullen, Fake: My Life as a Rogue Trader (London, 2004); Nick Leeson and Edward
Whitley, Rogue Trader (London, 1996); and Jérôme Kerviel, L’engrenage: Memoires d’un
trader (Paris, 2016).
2On the deﬁnition of rogue trading, see Marcelo G. Cruz, Gareth W. Peters, and Pavel
V. Shevchenko, Fundamental Aspects of Operational Risk and Insurance Analytics: A Hand-
book of Operational Risk (London, 2015); and Kimberly D. Krawiec, “Accounting for Greed:
Unravelling the Rogue Trader Mystery,” Oregon Law Review 79, no. 2 (2000): 301–38.
For a sociological approach, see Ian Greener, “Nick Leeson and the Collapse of Barings
Bank: Socio-Technical Networks and the ‘Rogue Trader,’” Organization 13, no. 3 (2006):
421–41.
3Mark N. Wexler, “Financial Edgework and the Persistence of Rogue Traders,” Business
and Society Review 115, no. 1 (2010): 1–25.
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therefore be portrayed as an operational risk arising from a rational
response to incentives in banks and ﬁnancial ﬁrms that encourage employ-
ees to engage in bounded risky behavior to maximize proﬁts.
Most ﬁnancial institutions have clear rules to monitor traders, but
the costs of completely preventing low-frequency but high-cost losses
generated by a single individual may be greater than the extra proﬁts
gained through “lucky” trading facilitated by norms that encourage
risky behavior.4 Firms may also seek to keep such episodes secret to
avoid ﬁnes or loss of reputation; an industry that relies on trust may
have an incentive to restrict transparency. The responsibility for illegal
behavior, when exposed, is shared among the bank as a legal entity,
the board of directors as a collective group, line managers, and the indi-
vidual trader. How this responsibility is distributed has particular
importance for the subsequent development of governance structures
and moral hazard. We will see that in the Lloyds case, the board of direc-
tors accepted no responsibility—and indeed were rewarded.
Beyond economic motives, there are psychological and biological
models of risky trading. John Coates and Joe Herbert note the effects
of adrenaline and hormonal changes that affect behavior in highly pres-
sured work environments, particularly among young men.5 These psy-
chological and gender factors are evident even in the early days of
liberalized markets. In September 1974, when the Lloyds scandal was
revealed, the Sunday Times proﬁled Midland Bank’s trading room as a
place where foreign exchange was “a youngish man’s game” and
traders “talk of the camaraderie of the business, of the satisfaction of
belonging to a select fraternity,” capturing large salaries compared to
other departments, but also prone to corruption.6 Behavioral economics
demonstrates how postponing the acceptance of losses can lead traders
to escalating behavior through serial decision-making, which can push
them to break the rules.7 Also, perception bias in managers may lead
them to overlook reality if they have a strong incentive to believe the
“myth” presented by the trader. As an operational risk, rogue trading
is commonly blamed on inadequate supervision and compliance that
4Donald C. Langevoort, “Monitoring: The Behavioural Economics of Corporate Compli-
ance with Law,” Columbia Business Law Review 2002, no. 1 (2002): 71–118.
5 John Coates, The Hour between Dog and Wolf: Risk-Taking, Gut Feelings, and the
Biology of Boom and Bust (New York, 2012); Joe Herbert, Testosterone: Sex, Power, and
the Will to Win (Oxford, 2015).
6 Philip Clarke, Sunday Times, 8 Sept. 1974. Susan Strange noted the high appetite for risk
in ﬁnancial markets in the 1970s, Casino Capitalism (London, 1986).
7Nicholas Barberis and Richard Thaler, “A Survey of Behavioral Finance,” inHandbook of
the Economics of Finance, ed. George M. Constantinides, M. Harris, and René Stulz (Amster-
dam, 2003), 1052–121; Helga Drummond and Julia Hodgson, Escalation in Decision-Making:
Behavioural Economics in Business (Farnham, U.K., 2011).
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allows the “rogue” to break the rules, but the case in Lugano Switzerland
in 1974 also demonstrates the importance of the market environment for
excessive risk-taking. Thus, operational risk is closely linked to
market risk.
For reference, Table 1 shows some major rogue trading episodes,
their value, and their outcomes. In the 1990s most ﬁrms were bank-
rupted or merged and in the 2000s senior executives were dismissed
in recognition of their ultimate responsibility for compliance failures.
The Lloyds Bank losses in 1974 were at the lower end of comparable
rogue trading scandals, and senior executives were not affected.
Anatomy of the Fraud
Lloyds Bank had a strong national and international reputation in
1974, with a total balance sheet of £4.6 billion. It was the smallest of
the four major clearing banks in London—about two-thirds the size of
Barclays, half that of Midland, and one-third that of NatWest.8
Founded in 1765, Lloyds Bank acquired its ﬁrst international ofﬁce, in
Paris, in 1911 and grew quickly in the twentieth century through acquisi-
tions. In 1971 the bank’s international operations were consolidated by
merging two subsidiaries (Bank of London and South America
(BOLSA) and Lloyds Bank Europe) to form what later became known
as Lloyds Bank International (LBI) in 1974. In 1969, Lloyds Bank com-
missioned William Clarke, a ﬁnancial journalist, to review its interna-
tional position. Clarke advised the board that their bank was on the
brink of being left behind in the new global ﬁnancial environment:
“Lloyds Bank Europe [LBE] has perhaps one year, or at most two
years, in which to carve out a substantial, proﬁtable place in interna-
tional banking for itself.”9 He urged the bank to think less like a tradi-
tional clearing bank and to engage more in wholesale, commercial, and
foreign-exchange trading, pointing to the success of the bank’s new
Zurich branch in increasing and diversifying the international banking
services it offered.10 Clarke’s vision included appointing local managers
“who have had intensive experience in the new kind of international
ﬁnance: foreign exchange, Euro-currency business, new Euro-bond
issues, advice to companies and on mergers. . . . They must be able to
build up a foreign exchange and interest arbitrage operation ‘out of
8 Forrest Capie, The Bank of England: 1950s to 1979 (Cambridge, U.K., 2010). There are
two early histories of Lloyds Bank: R. S. Sayers, Lloyds Bank in the History of English
Banking (Oxford, 1957); and J. R. Winton, Lloyds Bank, 1918–1969 (Oxford, 1982).
9William M. Clarke, “Lloyds Bank Europe: A Report,” Oct. 1969, HO/Ch/Fau/20, Lloyds
Banking Group Archives, London (hereafter LGA).
10 Ibid.
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Table 1
Major Foreign Exchange and Bond-Trading Fraud Episodes
Year Company Trader Losses ($US
billion)
Losses 2015 $US billion
(based on share of U.S. GDP)
Outcome for Firm
1974 Lloyds Bank
International
Marco Colombo 0.0784 0.913 Closure of branch
1994 Kidder Peabody Joseph Jett 0.35 0.86 Firm bankruptcy
1995 Barings Nick Leeson 1.4 3.29 Firm bankruptcy
1995 Daiwa Toshihide Iguchi 1.1 2.59 Firm ends U.S. operations, $340m ﬁne
1996 Morgan Grenfell Peter Young 0.66 1.47 Eventual sale to Deutsche Bank
1997 UBS Ramy Goldstein 0.68 1.42 Merger with SBC
2002 Allﬁrst Financial/
Allied Irish
John Rusnak 0.75 1.23 Sold to M&T Bank
2004 National Australia
Bank
David Bullen,
Vince Ficarra
0.25 0.37 Chairman and CEO resignation
2008 Société Générale Jérôme Kerviel 7.22 8.85 Net loss reported for 1 quarter, CEO
resigns (remains as chairman)
2011 UBS Kwedu Adoboli 2.3 2.67 CEO resignation, $40m ﬁne
Sources: Amy Poster and Elizabeth Southworth, “Lessons Not Learned: The Role of Operational Risk in Rogue Trading,”Risk Professional, June 2012, 21–26;
Samuel H. Williamson, “Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount, 1774 to Present,” Measuring Worth, accessed 10 Mar. 2017,
https://www.measuringworth.com/.
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nothing’ and make it proﬁtable . . . and altogether go out actively to get
business, rather than wait for it to come.”11 E. S. Tibbetts, general
manager of LBE, agreed with the general thrust of the report, particularly
the need to recruit more staff and improve training, noting that “original
thought is at present conﬁned very largely to London and Zurich.”12
Three Swiss branches of LBE (Zurich, Geneva, and Lugano) were
overseen locally by the Geneva branch. The Lugano ofﬁce, opened on
May 19, 1970, remained small, with 16 employees, compared with 230
in Geneva and 100 in Zurich. Located twenty miles from the Italian
border, the branch was meant to provide services mainly for Italian
“refugee” funds and to form a vanguard “should we eventually decide
to commence a banking operation within Italy.”13 High taxes and polit-
ical instability made deposits and investment advice across the border
attractive to high-value customers in Milan, and the branch initially
attracted funds successfully and generated fee-based income through
advisory and management services to personal customers. But the
basis of the branch’s activities would soon be transformed by the collapse
of the Bretton Woods system in 1971–1973.
InAugust 1971,U.S. PresidentRichardNixon suspended the convert-
ibility of the dollar to gold and challenged Japan and West Germany to
revalue their currencies against the dollar in order to take pressure off
the U.S. balance of payments; otherwise, the United States would
retreat behind protective tariffs. Following a fewmonths of hasty negoti-
ations, a new framework of pegged exchange rates was established at the
end of the year, but this solution proved only temporary. In June 1972,
sterling abandoned the pegged exchange-rate system, and most other
currencies had ﬂoated free from their U.S. dollar pegs by March 1973,
leading to a much more risky environment for foreign-exchange
trading. Suddenly, proﬁts could be earned through exchange trading on
the bank’s own books as well as on behalf of customers—but at the
same time, the market risks of this trading increased sharply.
This new environment for international ﬁnance posed particular
challenges when the old guard from the 1930s was retiring and banks
employed a generation of foreign-exchange traders with no experience
of ﬂoating rates. George Bolton, a Bank of England manager and chair-
man of BOLSA, was a key expert in foreign-exchange markets from the
last era of ﬂoating rates, in the 1930s, and he was on the management
11 Ibid.
12 E. S. Tibbetts to E. O. Faulkner (chairman of Lloyds Bank Ltd.), 3 Nov. 1969, HO/Ch/
Fau/20, LGA.
13M. R. Luthert for Chairman’s Committee, “Lugano Branch – Recommendation for
Closure,” 13 Apr. 1977, F/1/SS/Pre/2, LGA.
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board of LBI.14 But he turned seventy in October 1970, the usual retire-
ment age under LBI’s company rules. Bolton was reelected to the LBI
board, but he was not on the chairman’s committee that reviewed
foreign-exchange operations reports.
At about 5:00 p.m. on August 6, 1974, Robert Gras, chief foreign-
exchange manager at LBI in London, received a phone call from a
friend at the Paris ofﬁce of Crédit Lyonnais warning him that the LBI’s
Lugano branch had accumulated large amounts of outstanding
foreign-exchange operations with various branches of Crédit Lyonnais.
This had come to the caller’s attention because of an unusual simulta-
neous collection of paperwork from these branches after a period of
staff strikes.15 Kurt Senft, general manager of the Swiss ofﬁces, went to
Lugano the next day to investigate; on August 8 he was joined by three
LBI staff from London head ofﬁce, including Gras and Erich Whittle,
head of LBI’s European ofﬁces. When questioned, the dealer, Marc
Colombo—a Swiss national who, at twenty-eight, was the same age as
Nick Leeson of Barings and two years younger than Jérôme Kerviel at
Société Générale—reported losses of about 100 million Swiss francs
(SF). This initial estimate turned out to be only 45 percent of the eventual
total loss, SF 222.3 million, an amount that was larger than the capital of
the three Swiss branches altogether. Whittle and Gras took Colombo and
Egidio Mombelli (the branch manager) back to London on the weekend
of August 10 and 11 to determine the extent of the losses and the amount
of outstanding forward contracts. On Monday, August 12, the Bank of
England and then the Swiss National Bank and the Swiss Federal
Banking Commission were alerted to losses worth about £33 million.16
Colombo had joined LBI in March 1973, to start foreign-exchange
trading along with two junior clerks, just as the Bretton Woods pegged
exchange-rate regime collapsed. He had experience at Hill Samuel and
Co. in London as junior dealer and had spent eighteen months as
“second foreign exchange man” at Worms Bank in Geneva.17 In Decem-
ber 1973, the LBI head ofﬁce set a maximum open overnight position of
SF 5million for the Lugano ofﬁce, but Colombo ignored the limit because
“members of the management, at high managerial level, . . . cannot pos-
sibly understand fully how things take place and, consequently, they do
not realize themeaning of the limitations imposed upon our activities” as
14Gary Burn, The Re-emergence of Global Finance (London, 2006).
15 Robert Gras (manager of foreign exchange at LBI), testimony, 18 Sept. 1974, London,
HO/Gr/Off/2, LGA.
16 Sir Reginald Verdon-Smith (chairman of LBI) to all heads of divisions and departments
in London, overseas chiefmanagers, branchmanagers, and representatives, 19 Sept. 1974, F/1/
SS/Pre/2, LGA.
17Marc Colombo, testimony before public prosecutor for the jurisdiction of Sottocenerina,
6 Sept. 1974, Lugano, HO/Gr/Off/2, LGA. Contemporary translation from the archive.
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“foreign exchangemen.”18 He found the limit “too small viz a viz [sic] the
actual work carried out by us as foreign exchange men.” Some arrogance
is displayed here alongside pride in the title of “foreign exchange man”;
Colombo claimed that he had remained at the bank to try to recover his
losses “because—as is in fact typical among our particular category of
foreign exchange men—professional pride had been hurt.”19 His opera-
tions included spot transactions as well as deﬁnite term operations
(called “outrights”), forward contracts of up to six months, and swaps
with other banks. When he ran into difﬁculties covering his losses, he
hid copies of the forward exchange contracts in a box rather than
passing them through the branch accounts and made false entries to
the accounts sent by the branch to head ofﬁce. The branch manager
countersigned vouchers and reports without checking them.20
Colombo’s ﬁrst large transaction was in the summer of 1973: a spot
purchase of US$34 million against Swiss francs for resale in a forward
swap for settlement in twelve months. He then covered this with a
reverse transaction, selling the $34 million to purchase it back on a
swap basis each month. Colombo planned to generate a net proﬁt
based on the spread between the twelve-month and one-month swap
rates, and for a time he reported a proﬁt of SF 170,000 per month
(SF 170,000 per month notional loss on the twelve-month swap and
SF 340,000 proﬁt on the monthly deal). But in November 1973 the
dollar depreciated, leading to losses on both sides of the operation
totaling SF 320,000 per month. Colombo, now believing the dollar to
be overvalued, sold the $34 million spot with the intention to repur-
chase it at a lower rate in a month’s time and thus make good his
earlier losses. But in January 1974 the dollar appreciated sharply,
and he quickly repurchased the $34 million at a rate of SF 3.28 to
the dollar, having sold in November at SF 3.14 to the dollar, leading
to losses of SF 7 million. Although he anticipated being dismissed
from the bank if this loss was discovered, Colombo was conﬁdent he
would be able to secure a position with another bank as a dynamic
trader. He hid the losses because of damage to his pride, not for job
security. After a week he was convinced that the dollar would continue
to appreciate, so he recklessly bought $50 million against Swiss francs
and $50 million against deutsche marks at a term due in March/April
1974. However, having again guessed wrong on the dollar exchange
rate, Colombo’s trades led to accumulated losses of SF 50 million. In
his own words, “At this stage it was no longer a question of pride
18 Colombo, testimony, 24 Oct. 1974, Lugano, HO/Gr/Off/2, LGA.
19 Ibid.
20 Francis Paveley (LBI London), testimony at a hearing at Lugano Court, 7 May 1975, HO/
Gr/Off/2, LGA.
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but simply a question of ﬁnding myself bound by facts,” but he still did
not alert his employers. He claimed that he was aware of cases in
Lloyds branches in Rio de Janeiro and Madrid where losses of SF 20
million had been discovered and, as a result, the dealers were
“completely excluded from the profession,” prompting the Brazilian
dealer to commit suicide. Colombo later testiﬁed that the threat to
his career, even if he were not prosecuted, meant that “I considered
myself as being bound as a result of what had happened and I could
not see any other way out but to remain at my own post and endeavour
to recover the loss by means of subsequent operations.” As losses esca-
lated, so too did the risks, and he ended up with an open position for
$550 million, having started with a purchase of $34 million less than a
year earlier. Rather forlornly, he said that “having started on this path,
I was unable to change course.”21
In his testimony to the Lugano magistrate, Colombo described six
methods he had used to “camouﬂage” the losses and the exchange posi-
tions.22 When asked if he knew of other banks that did these kinds of
transactions, he remarked that “it is clear that I lack the genius to have
been the inventor of such reﬁned methods of camouﬂage all on my
own.”23 From March 1974 he had recorded outright purchases of foreign
currency as outstanding swaps, thereby avoiding or delaying reports of
losses in the daily accounts: “This we call ‘keeping a slip in the drawer,’”
he testiﬁed.24 He clearly felt part of a community of foreign-exchange
men who acted according to norms they had set themselves.
Colombo’s transactions were spread across a wide range of interna-
tional banks in Switzerland, London, Luxembourg, Frankfurt, and
Cologne, although most were with Swiss banks. Table 2 shows outstand-
ing forward contracts against deutsche marks and Swiss francs as of
August 12, 1974. The total was almost $560 million, 60 percent of
which was against deutsche marks, dating from October 10, 1973. Over
time, the pace of Colombo’s trading increased and the terms shortened;
by February 1974 he had begun six-month deals, setting up twenty-seven
operations in April 1974 with settlement dates in October and peaking at
forty-ﬁve three-month trades during July, all of which were due to
mature in October.25 This was taking place exactly at the time of increas-
ing volatility in the dollar exchange rate.
21 Colombo, testimony, 6 Sept. 1974, LGA.
22Marc Colombo, “Methods Used in the Foreign Exchange Business to Conceal Exchange
Positions or Losses,” written testimony, 29 Oct. 1974, Lugano, HO/Gr/Off/2, LGA.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 As the deals matured, London arranged a series of transactions to unwind them. N. S.
Lister to R. J. R. Gras, memo, 7 Mar. 1975, F/1/SS/Pre/2, LGA.
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There is little evidence that Colombo beneﬁted ﬁnancially from the
rogue trading itself. Mombelli, the branch manager, noted that
Colombo was not eligible for performance bonuses, nor was he compet-
ing for status with other traders.26 He was offered and accepted a per-
sonal refund of 20 percent of the commission fee paid by LBI to
FINEX S.A. of Zurich, amounting to SF 30,000, but he had confessed
and signed it over to LBI while he was in London being questioned.27
At the time, Colombo’s salary was SF 4,500 per month, so this sum
was more than six months’ salary. The kickback was not an integral
part of covering his losses, although it does show his propensity to
break rules.28 He argued that this kickback had taken no funds away
from the bank, since LBI would have had to pay the full commission
even if Colombo did not accept the money.
In the end, the episode was an embarrassment rather than a ﬁnan-
cial disaster. The trading losses were about the equivalent of £33.5
million, or two-thirds of LBI’s authorized capital, but the Lloyds Group
had assets of over £500 million and pretax proﬁts of £77 million in the
ﬁrst half of 1974, so the losses were easily recovered.29 Moreover, the
actual losses were mitigated by insurance and tax provisions. LBI had
a banker’s blanket policy that insured against criminal acts by employ-
ees, covering the group for up to £6 million for “each and every loss.”
Table 2
Summary of Outstanding Forward Contracts at August 12, 1974
(millions)
USD DM Rate USD SF Rate
Due end Aug. −95.0 224.4745 2.3945 −35.6 99.274 2.788
Due end Sept. −119.8 296.9111 2.4780 5.004222 −20.398 4.075
Due end Oct. −119.4 297.7445 2.4937 −163.997505 485.1923 2.958
Due end Nov./Dec. −3.5 9.07325 2.59236 −24.4 77.21928 3.165
Up to end of May 1975 −2.975 8.830515 2.968
TOTAL −337.7 831.30335 2.4614 −221.968282 650.118095 2.928
Source: William Taggert (interim general manager of LBI for Switzerland), testimony before
public Prosecutor for the Jurisdication of Sottocenerina, 9 Sept. 1974, 7004, LGA. There was an
additional contract sale of US$1.28 million against FF 6.1458 at a rate of 4.80375 with Credit
Industriel et Commercial, London.
Notes: DM= deutsche marks; FF = French francs; SF = Swiss francs; USD =U.S. dollars.
26 Egidio Mombelli, statement to Police of the Ticino Canton, 5 Sept. 1974, Lugano, HO/
Gr/Off/2, LGA.
27 Colombo, “Methods Used” statement, 29 Oct. 1974, LGA.
28Mombelli, statement to police, 5 Sept. 1974, LGA.
29 Verdon-Smith to all Heads of Divisions and Departments, 19 Sept. 1974, LGA.
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They had thus priced the operational risk rather too modestly. Since
there was a danger that Colombo and Mombelli might be acquitted or
that LBI might be deemed to have contributed to the loss through its
own negligence, the board quickly accepted £5 million offered by the
insurance company. Additionally, LBI could claim U.K. tax relief (at 52
percent) against £23 million of the total gross loss of £33.5 million.30
The board also increased LBI’s authorized capital from £50 million to
£75 million immediately.31
Although neither ﬁnancially ruinous nor systemically contagious,
the case was widely covered in the business press, including lurid
details of Colombo’s villa and sneering accounts of the supervisory sham-
bles in the Lugano ofﬁce. All of this reﬂected badly on the governance
provided by London head ofﬁce and the local Geneva ofﬁce.
Checks and Balances
During 1972, LBI’s head ofﬁce in London compiled a rule book for
use by all branches overseas. This resource, which covered the full
range of operating procedures, was to replace the previous BOLSA and
LBE rule books and was sent to the Swiss branches in January 1973,
before Colombo arrived at Lugano. Mombelli claimed that because
there was virtually no foreign-exchange trading at his branch at the
time, he “didn’t bother to read that section about the dealer” and so
did not realize there was supposed to be a daily dealer’s book recording
all transactions.32 The gap between the LBI rule book and compliance
was at the heart of the supervisory failure; perversely, in this case the
complex rules-based system reduced the likelihood of effective compli-
ance and enforcement.
Head ofﬁce delegated operational responsibility for supervision of
Swiss branches to the Geneva ofﬁce, where Senft was the general
manager. Colombo was trained for two weeks at the Geneva branch
when he joined the bank in 1973. Senft inspected the Lugano branch in
March of that year, when Colombo began his employment, but not sub-
sequently.33 Geneva received monthly and quarterly reports from all
Swiss branches and used these to compile its reports for the Swiss
National Bank. LBI head ofﬁce also sent staff out periodically for spot
inspections that included the foreign-exchange operations, but they
neglected the Lugano branch in March 1973 because trading there was
minimal. This proved an important oversight that may have given
30D. A. Ferguson to LBI board, memo, 20 Sept. 1974, F/1/SS/Pre/2, LGA.
31 LBI board, minutes, 24 Sept. 1974, F/1/D/Boa/1.1, LGA.
32 Ibid. The Rule Book was written under the direction of LBI director Francis Paveley.
33 Egidio Mombelli, testimony, 9 May 1975, Lugano, HO/Gr/Off/2, LGA.
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Colombo greater conﬁdence in his ability to conceal losses until they
could be reversed. In September 1974 (a month after the Colombo case
broke) a case of “mismanagement and irregularities” in the investment
portfolio operations at the Zurich branch was uncovered, and a portfolio
manager at Zurich resigned, so Senft’s supervisory myopia extended
beyond Lugano to Zurich.34 The Geneva ofﬁce came in for considerable
criticism from London for not ensuring that the LBI rules were followed
at Lugano, but clearly head ofﬁce had also failed to perceive a problem.
Within the Lugano branch, the manager was responsible for super-
vising the full range of activity: initialing each trading slip, checking the
accounts daily, initialing all incoming letters of conﬁrmation from corre-
spondent banks, and signing off on the monthly accounts sent to the
Geneva ofﬁce. The costs, in terms of time and training, of making this
procedure effective turned out to be excessive, and Mombelli admitted
that he had initialed trading slips and accounts without checking that
they were valid.35 He claimed to “well remember having sent to
Colombo at least three memorandums, possibly four, with which I
ordered him to reduce the extent of his operations,” but still, discovering
the losses was “like lightning in a clear blue sky.”36 Partly, this surprise
arose because Mombelli had not instructed Colombo to keep a dealer’s
book to be checked at the end of each day, as was the practice in
Zurich and Geneva. Exchange inspections by LBI head ofﬁce were
carried out at these larger branches in March 1973, but not at Lugano
“because it was supposed to be dealing in a very small way,” according
to Francis Paveley of LBI London, who wrote the report for the Swiss
Federal Banking Commission.37 In fact, Lugano was trading at a much
larger scale than either Zurich or Geneva. Mombelli lacked the compe-
tency to understand the transactions he was approving, and he relied
heavily on Colombo’s expertise in the complexities of foreign-exchange
trading. Mombelli was clearly a key source of prudential failure, but
his errors should have been caught at the Geneva ofﬁce through their
direct inspection and enforcement of the rule book. Mombelli later
claimed that he had no personal experience with foreign-exchange
dealing and was not familiar with the Hilfsbucher (“Book of Rules”)
sent by head ofﬁce, which he had not had time to read carefully. Nor
had he taken time to read other instructions from head ofﬁce.38
34 Chairman’s Committee, minutes, 17 Sept. 1974, F/1/SS/Pre/2, LGA.
35Mombelli, testimony, 9 May 1975, LGA.
36 Egidio Mombelli, testimony before investigating magistrate, 13 Nov. 1974, Lugano, HO/
Gr/Off/2, LGA.
37 Court hearing, 7 May 1975, Lugano, HO/Gr/Off/2, LGA.
38Dario Clericotti (advocate, Lugano) to Erich Whitle (director, LBI), 19 Nov. 1974, HO/
Gr/Off/2, LGA.
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Moreover, althoughMombelli had signed off on falsiﬁed transactions, he
testiﬁed, “I presume that one does not expect any BankManager to check
each and every document which is put before him for initialling. It is
instead usual for the Manager to carry out the so-called ‘Stichproben’
(random inspections).”39 Given that the branch comprised only sixteen
staff, Mombelli’s claims of pressures on his time appeared exaggerated
to LBI staff in London. Paveley, of head ofﬁce, testiﬁed that “in a
branch of that size, the manager could have known exactly what was
happening. . . . Possibly M. did not grasp the signiﬁcance of the
amounts involved, but he thought that they were doing big business,
making a lot of money[,] and was speaking of taking another ﬂoor in
the building.”40 Clearly, the combination of time pressures and a lack
of expertise had led Mombelli to trust Colombo excessively in the
summer of 1974. His failure to query the incoming letters of conﬁrmation
from correspondent banks that described very large transactions subse-
quently prompted changes to the internal controls within LBI.
Colombo (in his own defense) also blamed Mombelli: “I have been a
bank exchange dealer for 5 years and have never had so little supervision
by a management. I might rather say that at Lloyds Lugano there existed
no supervision. In fact, had Monsieur Mombelli done his work, which
consisted in the supervision of his staff, he would have realised the
real position of his Branch.”41 While public testimony might be self-
serving, the evidence clearly shows the slippage between London and
Switzerland and the failure of internal systems within Switzerland to
enforce the rules set centrally. It is clear that LBI London considered
Mombelli complicit, either deliberately—by ignoring or by tolerating
Colombo’s behavior in the expectation that it would generate branch
proﬁts and an expansion of his branch—or implicitly, by not educating
himself in the complexities of the deals undertaken by his staff. But
the issues of compliance extended well beyond any individual failings
by Mombelli.
The bank’s internal analysis of the scandal was critical of the quality
of personnel as well as the operational weaknesses in supervision and
accountability at LBI’s Swiss branches. Importantly, it became clear
that Colombo was not a unique rogue. The bank’s chief inspector
reported that Swiss visa restrictionsmade it difﬁcult to ﬁnd enough qual-
iﬁed staff, so that LBI was required “to ﬁll a substantial proportion of
executive vacancies simply by hiring people off the street” rather than
promoting trusted, long-serving staff “whose honesty is virtually
39Mombelli, testimony before investigating magistrate, 14 Feb. 1975, Lugano, HO/Gr/Off/
2, LGA.
40 Francis Paveley, testimony at court hearing, 7 May 1975, Lugano, HO/Gr/Off/2, LGA.
41 Colombo, “Methods Used” statement, 29 Oct. 1974, LGA.
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beyond question.”42 He also emphasized how the norms of Swiss
banking conﬂicted with a culture of adherence to formal rules:
The business of our Swiss Branches involving as it does, tax avoid-
ance by customers domiciled abroad, implies numbered accounts,
“keep mail” facilities, agreement not to communicate in writing
with customers and a tendency to rely on customers’ verbal instruc-
tions by telephone. This type of secret, undercover, business clearly
leaves wide loopholes for the dishonest executive to manipulate cus-
tomers’ funds for his own beneﬁt.43
The report recommended that “a proper system of reporting to London
must be set up—lack of this was a substantial contributory cause of the
Lugano affair.” The chief inspector discounted the obstacle of Swiss
banking secrecy, noting that so long as the information was not used
“for control purposes” (i.e., by British regulatory authorities), the infor-
mation could cross borders. With regard to banking norms, the report
described complicated evasion practices whereby
a substantial proportion of the business of Swiss Branches is routed
to Panamanian subsidiaries thus by-passing Swiss lending ceilings
and avoiding Swiss proﬁts tax. The subsidiaries are Panamanian in
name only and all work relating to them is effected in our own
Branches in Switzerland by our own bank staff. Millions of dollars
in proﬁts are involved—were we to be required by the Swiss author-
ities to cover back proﬁts tax stretching over a number of years (and
there is no question that, under Swiss law, we are liable) it is not at all
clear that we could now offset against UK taxes. Of course for a small
Swiss bank, operating through a Panamanian “suitcase” company
might be rather clever always provided one does not get caught.
For the Branch of a large international bank to involve itself in this
kind of thing makes no sense at all—the loans concerned could
equally well be carried on the books of London or on those of one
of the many other vehicles available to us outside Switzerland.44
Indeed, the Swiss banking environment was prone to scandal. In March
1977 an internal investigation revealed that staff at Credit Suisse’s
Chiasso ofﬁce (also near the Italian border) had illegally transferred
capital from Italy on behalf of customers to evade taxes, using a
holding company in Liechtenstein, Texon Finanzanstalt, run from
within the Chiasso branch. Credit Suisse had to bear ﬁnancial losses of
42 Chief Inspector to Vice Chairman’s Committee, “Inspection of Swiss Branches – August/
November 1974,” 2 Jan. 1975, F/1/SS/Pre/2, LGA.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
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SF 2 billion ($830 million).45 The subsequent trial concluded that this
illegal activity had been concealed from head ofﬁce for sixteen years.
The Chiasso scandal prompted the Swiss Bankers Association to adopt
a code of conduct on acceptance of suspicious funds and challenged
the formal Swiss secrecy laws for banking.
The internal inspection concluded that LBI’s Geneva branch was the
most robust, although there were still difﬁculties there. The March 1973
inspection report was highly critical, particularly of the department
heads and their acceptance of responsibility. In the November 1974
inspection, it was noted that “it is pleasing to report that good progress
in the right direction is being made” although more training was
required because “it is not enough to provide them with excerpts of the
Book and expect them to ‘get on’ with it. The Rules have to be discussed
and the underlying reasons explained where necessary.”46 Compliance
was clearly at the root of the problems at LBI. The penalties for not fol-
lowing the rules were not clear, and widespread evasion even at senior
level conﬁrmed that local norms overrode the rule book.
The chief inspector recommended that “one must bear in mind . . .
the emphasis which—following on the merger—was put on proﬁts at
any prices, presumably as a result of the McKinsey inspired ideas
which were then current. A substantial expansion in business—particu-
larly in exchange dealing for the Bank’s own account—was undertaken at
Swiss Branches without any proper strengthening of the administrative
framework.”47 The Lugano fraud was not an accident, but a result of the
rush to expand the bank’s operations in the face of opportunity and com-
petition, and a failure of human resource management in a labor market
with a shortage of qualiﬁed staff.
The evidence from legal testimony and from the bank’s internal
investigation portrays a catalog of errors and mismanagement at each
level of the bank, from Colombo to the London head ofﬁce. The legal tes-
timony is at times contradictory, taking into account themany interviews
of the main protagonists, and contains clearly self-interested efforts to
shift blame to other parties. The archival evidence reveals the range of
errors and mistakes as well as the attitudes of the individuals concerned.
After embarking on a rapid expansion at the start of the 1970s, the
London board was complacent about the degree of compliance with
their rules and norms among newly recruited overseas staff at a physical
45Hans-Ulrich Doerig, “Operational Risks in Financial Services: AnOld Challenge in aNew
Environment,” Credit Suisse Group, London, 2000, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.28.2951&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
46 Chief Inspector, “Inspection of Swiss Branches –August/November 1974,” report to Vice
Chairman’s Committee 2 Jan. 1975. F/1/SS/Pre/2 LGA.
47 Ibid.
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and psychic distance from London, where they operated in a very differ-
ent and often secretive banking environment.
Internal Response
Mombelli was sentenced in October 1975 to six months for “disloyal
administration” and Colombo to eighteen months for the same charge
plus “falsiﬁcation of documents,” although both prison sentences were
suspended. Outside court, Colombo reportedly stated, “I hope to ﬁnd
another job in the same ﬁeld—this trial was good publicity,” although
there is no trace of his subsequent career.48 The Lugano submanager
was given six months’ notice to resign. Senft, the Geneva chief
manager, resigned at the end of October (but was paid for the next
three months). The manager and the legal adviser at Zurich followed
suit in January 1975. After a subsequent inspection of all Swiss branches,
more staff in Zurich were “found unsuitable,” including an investment
portfolio manager and two foreign-exchange dealers.49 The portfolio
manager and the junior exchange dealer were allowed to resign but the
senior exchange dealer, “who was fairly well known in banking circles
in Switzerland,” was dismissed without compensation on October 18
since his was “amore serious case.”50 The portfolio manager was respon-
sible for losses of about SF 4 million, compared with Colombo’s SF 222
million. As the penalty for being caught breaking the rules, some Swiss
staff lost their jobs, but perhaps not their reputations.
At head ofﬁce, by contrast, no heads rolled. The board of LBI was for-
mally told at its regular meeting on August 28, 1974, that total losses
were expected to be £33 million and that the Lloyds Bank board had
agreed to underwrite the losses, with the approval of the Bank of
England.51 At the same meeting, new branches in Cairo and Guatemala
were approved, so the episode did not affect the expansion of LBI’s activ-
ities into physically and culturally distant markets. At a meeting of the
vice chairman’s committee there was a fuller discussion; the committee
concluded, rather mildly, that because “manymanagers had little knowl-
edge of themechanics of exchange operations, amemorandum should be
given to every branch manager with an exchange department setting out
the points they should have in mind in controlling these operations.”52
At the time of the LBI scandal, the structure of Lloyds Bank Group
was under review, and the outcome is surprising. After the full
48 “Suspended terms for 2 in Lloyds case,” New York Times, 31 Oct. 1975.
49 Vice Chairman’s Committee, draft minutes, 18 Oct. 1974, F/1/SS/Pre/2, LGA.
50 Ibid.
51 LBI board, minutes, 28 Aug. 1974, F/1/D/Boa/1.1, LGA.
52 Vice Chairman’s Committee, minutes, 5 Sept. 1974, F/1/SS/Pre/2, LGA.
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acquisition of the share capital of LBI and Lloyds Bank California, it was
agreed in September 1974—while the scandal was under investigation—
to transfer all international activities (other than Grindleys and Lloyds
Bank’s own overseas department) to the responsibility of the LBI
board. This decision ignored the recent lapse of oversight that had
embroiled the bank in a costly and embarrassing scandal. Despite the
events of August, LBI took over control and utilization of resources
and supervision of subsidiary banks, including credit risks and expo-
sure.53 LBI would also direct the group’s public relations, “recruitment,
training and career development of personnel at home and overseas” and
approve expansion into new territories. K. R. M. Carlisle tendered his
resignation “consequent upon these arrangements,” and Lord Lloyd
(chairman of the National Bank of New Zealand) and Stafford
R. Grady (chairman of Lloyds Bank California) joined the LBI board.
There was apparently no responsibility cast upon board members for
the lapse in governance and, indeed, the board’s powers in the group
were considerably enhanced. This outcome contrasts with several
cases, shown in Table 1, in which senior executives at head ofﬁce
resigned.
InDecember 1974 the Lloyds Group Committeemet for the ﬁrst time
and investigated LBI’s lending and trading practices. They “noted that
LBI’s present procedure did not provide for limiting the overall
maximum commitment of any one customer or group of customers; indi-
vidual executive directors had unlimited lending powers; and facilities
were not reported to the Board.”54 On currency dealing, the committee
“noted the change in the pattern of dealing following the switch to ﬂoat-
ing exchange rates and acknowledged the consequent additional risk and
volatile nature of themarkets.” LBI itself undertook a study to reduce the
number of dealing centers and consider overall policy in this area “with
particular reference to methods of operation and control.” So the
foreign-exchange operations of the LBI were not formally censured,
despite the most costly lapse in governance in the bank’s history. Never-
theless, new measures were taken to tighten up procedures.
In November 1975, the chief executive ofﬁcer of LBI wrote to all
general managers, chief managers, and senior managers, noting that
“what happened in Lugano was not the ﬁrst time that an executive of
conﬁdence has been able to feed vouchers and returns into the branch
system with apparently the second signatory believing that his initial
or signature was a mere formality carrying no responsibility. And,
unfortunately, another case has occurred since the Lugano
53 LBI board, minutes, 24 Sept. 1974, F/1/D/Boa/1.1, LGA.
54 LBI board, minutes, 17 Dec. 1974, F/1/D/Boa/1.1, LGA.
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investigation.”55 The problem was particularly acute when, “the human
situation which arises in our smaller branches where executives work
closely together day in and day out. I am also most concerned to keep
a happy spirit of cooperation amongst executives throughout the Bank.
Nevertheless, each executive has a loyalty which goes beyond that of
his local senior and no executive should give his written assent to any-
thing which either he does not understand or knows to be irregular.”
The letter was not sent directly to foreign branch managers, to whom
it was mainly aimed, but was sent to the functional ofﬁcers in the
London head ofﬁce. In the meantime, more formal structural changes
were made.
Partly in response to the Bank of England’s request that U.K. banks
reﬂect on the governance of foreign-exchange trading, LBI’s operations
were tightened in February 1975 into a more centralized hierarchy. Ulti-
mate control was vested in the director of the Exchange and Money
Market Division (EMMD), who had the authority to instruct any execu-
tive in any branch worldwide.56 New York and London ofﬁces were
appointed time zone branches, with overall jurisdiction for the Americas
and Europe, respectively, and reporting to the EMMD. In an important
new check, “correspondent banks will, in due course, be requested to
send copies of branches’ nostro accounts to Exchange and Money
Market Division, Head Ofﬁce, London.” New York would forward
copies of overseas branches’ nostro accounts to London every month,
and daily movements in these accounts would be monitored by “all
Chief Managers and Branch Managers.”57 The conﬁrmation letters
from correspondent banks were meant to act as a further external
check on the operations of individual dealers in case they managed to
hide their trades from the daily accounts. In the Lugano case, the conﬁr-
mation letters had arrived on the branch manager’s desk and he had
merely initialed them without further enquiry, despite the huge
amounts they were reporting.
The Lugano branch never recovered from the debacle of 1974. After
accumulating operating proﬁts totaling SF 1.2 million for the two years
ending in September 1973, the branch moved into sustained losses.58
The exchange loss in 1974 was followed by operating losses in the follow-
ing two years totaling SF 1.1 million. Customer deposits fell by 45 percent
the year after the scandal and never recovered. In August 1976 the LBI
board noted that “Lugano no longer offers attractions as a domestic
55D. G. Mitchell (CEO, LBI) to R. B. Hobson (secretary, head ofﬁce), 11 Nov. 1975, F/1/SS/
Pre/2, LGA.
56 LBI Exchange and Money Market Policy, 10 Feb. 1975, HO/CH/Fau/30, LGA.
57 Ibid.
58 Lugano Branch balance sheet, F/1/SS/Pre/2, LGA.
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banking centre and it is unlikely that our branch there will ever be prof-
itable.”59 The Swiss National Bank, when approached for its views on LBI
closing the branch, “indicated that it would not object.”60 In April 1977
the board decided to close the Lugano branch because its core cross-
border business with Italy had dried up, due to tighter legislative controls
in Italy from 1976, and because “local ﬁnancial scandals additionally
have lowered the image of Lugano as a ﬁnancial centre.” Moreover,
Lloyds refused “to participate in the illicit transfer of funds from Italy,
a practice which many of our competitors undertake.”61 Thus ended
LBI’s rather inglorious adventure in Lugano.
While the scandal had important implications for LBI, these tended
to be transitory rather than transformative. In contrast, the impact on
British supervisory procedures was out of proportion to the size and sys-
temic effect of the scandal in the U.K. banking system. The rogue trading
episode exposed stark differences in attitude to the regulation and super-
vision of international banking between the Bank of England and the
Treasury and prompted more fundamental changes at both a national
and international level.
External Response
The deputy governor of the Bank of England, Jasper Hollom, was
initially advised by the Lloyds London ofﬁce that substantial losses
had been identiﬁed at the Lugano branch, over the weekend of August
10–11, 1974. Douglas Wass, permanent secretary to the Treasury, was
informed the following Monday.62 At ﬁrst, Hollom and LBI ofﬁcers
believed that the losses “might be hushed up.” The Treasury secretary
Douglas Wass disagreed, but disclosure was delayed and journalists
were kept at bay after appeals from the Swiss National Bank for contin-
ued secrecy while they completed their own investigation.63 The Trea-
sury was very frustrated by the Bank of England’s complacent attitude.
Hollom casually remarked that there was probably no way to have
caught a rogue dealer’s speculation in time, although he admitted that
the branch manager might bear some responsibility. His initial reaction
was that there was no cause to change any policies or practices. Financial
secretary Derek Mitchell, in contrast, argued that “no organization with
59 LBI board, minutes, 10 Aug. 1976, F/1/D/Boa/1.2, LGA.
60 Ibid.
61M. R. Luthert, “Lugano Branch – Recommendation for Closure,” 13 Apr. 1977, 9034,
LGA; LBI board, minutes, 19 Apr. 1977, F/1/D/Boa/1.2, LGA.
62Douglas Wass to Lawrence Airey (ﬁnancial secretary), memo, 12 Aug. 1974, T233/2942,
The National Archives, London (hereafter TNA).
63Derek Mitchell, memo, 22 Aug. 1974, T233/2942, TNA.
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any pretentions to efﬁciency could accept a situation in which a loss of
this magnitude was possible. Lloyds would have to do something if
only to arrange that in future dealers worked in pairs.”64 Mitchell con-
cluded that “we can have no conﬁdence that this matter will be
handled effectively by Lloyds but I hesitate to suggest that we should
involve ourselves more directly lest any of the mud that may ﬂy
around sticks in the wrong place.” For the ﬁnancial secretary, avoiding
any semblance of responsibility prevailed over forcing Lloyds to take
quick action.
Others were more forthright about the potential reputational risk if
it was discovered that the Bank or the Treasury had colluded with Lloyds
in withholding important market information. On August 29 (two weeks
after the Bank of England was made aware of the losses) the Chancellor
of the Exchequer asked the Bank of England to approach Lloyds again to
urge public disclosure.65 Lloyds claimed that the Swiss authorities
wanted to wait until they were assured that all losses had been identiﬁed,
and Lloyds hoped to delay an announcement until its normal third-
quarter report in October—if it had not already been leaked to the
press.66 In fact, the Swiss press threatened to publish the story and so
the losses (and the fact that they had already been recovered) were
announced on September 2, 1974, almost a month after the fraud had
been discovered.
At the Bank of England, the Lugano debacle initiated a debate over
how to deal with overseas branches of U.K. banks. John L. Sangster
noted that “prima facie the losses sustained by the LBI branch in
Lugano suggest that we ﬁrst turn to the foreign exchange area and
impose some sort of reporting and possibly limits akin to those that we
impose on banks in the UK.”67 But he pointed out that controls on
foreign exchange dealing were not prudential—rather, they were
designed to protect the foreign-exchange reserves from interest arbitrage
or long positions—so they were only monitored against sterling (not
other currencies). The limits were thus a tool of exchange control
related to the balance of payments, not a means of monitoring risky
behavior by individual institutions. The Bank of England set formal
daily limits and could make spot checks at any time, but reports of
64DerekMitchell to Postmaster General, note on a lunch with Hollom, 23 Aug. 1974, T233/
2942, TNA.
65 S. A. Robson (Chancellor of Exchequer’s ofﬁce) to Private Secretary to Financial Secre-
tary, 29 Aug. 1974, T233/2942, TNA.
66Derek Mitchell, note, 28 Aug. 1974, T233/2942, TNA.
67 John L. Sangster to Sir Kit McMahon, memo, 19 Sept. 1974, 349A/2, Bank of England
Archive (hereafter BoE). See also Catherine R. Schenk, “Summer in the City: Banking Scandals
of 1974 and the Development of International Banking Supervision,” English Historical
Review 129, no. 540 (2014): 1129–56.
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overall positions were usually examined weekly with more detailed
reports only monthly. The basic limits were £50,000 combined spot
and forward open positions, and a further £100,000 in spot foreign
assets could be held against forward sales of foreign currency, although
some banks were given larger limits (mainly multinationals and clear-
ers). The Bank of England reported that “we very rarely ﬁnd that a
bank has a position exceeding £10 million in any one currency, and
make enquiries when this occurs.”68 By way of comparison, the small
LBI ofﬁce in Lugano had accumulated an open position of $560
million by August 1974.
Sangster wondered, “Do we then just shrug our shoulders at the
losses incurred by LBI Lugano? There is sometimes a management
advantage in not overloading administrative procedures by over-react-
ing to a single instance of loss. But there is a problem in the LBI
Lugano area which we have to probe, perhaps to satisfy our own misgiv-
ings and certainly to satisfy the paternalistic instincts of HMT.”69 The
problem was whether the geographic and cultural distance from
normal U.K. practice “mean that foreign branches have much more
autonomy and scope for error and adventure” and whether they are
therefore adequately supervised by their parent home ofﬁce. This obser-
vation shows tacit acceptance that the Bank’s prudential supervision of
banks in London was based largely on local culture, moral suasion,
and peer pressure that might not be effective in other banking centers.70
Pressure from the Treasury, and a reluctant recognition that there
may arise a gap in supervision, eventually prompted the Bank of
England to draft a letter warning banks to exercise effective control
over their branches both within and outside the United Kingdom, partic-
ularly since the foreign-exchange positions of branches and subsidiaries
overseas were not included in the regular returns made to the Bank.71
Even this step was controversial, with some in the Bank ﬁnding it
“otiose and naive” and feeling “that its only justiﬁcation would be the
cosmetic effect of suggesting to Whitehall that we were not letting
Lugano pass into oblivion without taking action.”72 Roy Fenton (senior
68Richard Hallett to Governor of Bank of England Gordon Richardson, memo, 5 Sept.
1974, 349A/2, BoE.
69 Ibid.
70Meanwhile, on October 15, 1974, the Banque de Bruxelles announced losses through
irregularities in its foreign-exchange ofﬁce amounting to about 1 to 2.5 million Belgian
francs from unauthorized trading. For other scandals, see Schenk, “Summer in the City.”
71 Governor to Chairmen of British banks, draft letter, 25 Oct. 1974, 349A/2, BoE. Themain
points of the letter are detailed in Schenk, “Summer in the City.”
72George Blunden to John Fforde and Sir Kit McMahon, note (not expressing his own
views), 29 Oct. 1974, 349A/2, BoE. The chief cashier, John Page, was opposed to the letter’s
tone and wished it to be “exhortatory.” Blunden to McMahon and Fforde, note, 6 Nov. 1974,
349A/2, BoE.
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ofﬁcial at the Bank of England) argued that “this is an area in which we
have a responsibility,” particularly if the banks were likely to call on the
reserves “to rectify misjudgements or misdemeanours.”73 Richard
Hallett (senior ofﬁcial at the Bank of England) advocated a “low key”
and “more chatty form” to be sent to general managers from George
Blunden (head of supervision at the Bank of England) or the chief
cashier rather than from the governor, but he also wanted some side
mention of the “need to watch the relationship of young dealers with
brokers . . . and the danger inherent in board policies which have in
recent years . . . laid down proﬁt targets or created proﬁt expectations
for the dealing operations of their banks.”74 After nearly a month, it
was ﬁnally agreed that formal advice would not merely be “cosmetic”
and that the Bank should monitor the dealing limits given to branches
and subsidiaries to “ensure that senior management of banks keep
such authorities under strict review” as well as allowing the Bank to iden-
tify where “unduly lax” practices were being applied.75 The letter was
sent not only to all authorized banks registered in the United Kingdom
(113), but also to authorized branches of foreign banks in London
(141). The Chancellor of the Exchequer was shown the letter in
advance as evidence that the Bank of England was taking some action
in response to Lugano, and thus it served the “cosmetic” purpose.
Conclusion
Rogue trading, a rare but persistent operational risk in ﬁnancial
trading, has been studied surprisingly little in a historical context.
Instead, the literature has relied on public sources such as newspapers,
court cases, and autobiography. Examining the archival record reveals
not only how banks and regulators sought initially to cover up the
Lloyds’s losses in 1974, but also a surprising lack of remedial action
even when an internal inspection revealed wider compliance issues in
Swiss branches. In contrast to more recent examples, the most senior
executives took no responsibility, nor were they viewed as responsible.
The LBI scandal also shows that there are limits to the mitigation that
can be achieved by elaborate rules and cross-checking if those rules
are not supported by the institution’s norms or by the speciﬁc norms
of the trading room. Colombo’s ego as a “foreign exchange man” and
the importance he placed on his individual reputation drew him to
trade beyond ﬁxed limits, hide losses, and escalate risk. In the end, an
73Roy Fenton to Blunden, note, 30 Oct. 1974, 349A/2, BoE.
74Richard Hallett to Blunden, 4 Nov. 1974, 349A/2, BoE.
75 Blunden to Fforde, 18 Nov. 1974, 349A/2, BoE.
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external whistle-blower alerted his head ofﬁce and this third-party check
was later institutionalized by Lloyds Bank. These features are very
similar to those of rogue-trading scandals forty years later.
But unlike participants in recent cases, Colombo was not competing
with other traders in his ﬁrm, had no bonus system built around his per-
formance, and faced relatively low expectations from his managers. Nor
was he an established “superstar” as a result of previous successes built
on risky behavior. These are clearly not necessary elements for rogue
trading. Instead, the combination of overconﬁdence and inadequate
supervision at a time of enhanced market risk was at the root of the
initial losses. Subsequently, pride and then job security motivated
Colombo to engage in an unsuccessful cover-up. His sequential deci-
sion-making led to increasingly reckless bets on the dollar exchange
rate until he felt pressure to engage in a fraudulent loan to cover his
tracks. There is no evidence that LBI’s head ofﬁce encouraged risky
behavior in foreign-exchange dealing, but its rules, devised in an era of
low risk in exchange markets, did not ﬁt with the norms of Swiss
banking (including secrecy, informality, and a lack of paper records) or
with the new market risks posed by ﬂexible exchange rates.
The Bank of England was blind to risks in foreign-exchange dealing
in overseas branches despite the vulnerability of the domestic banking
system to losses that could accumulate very quickly in volatile
markets. It relied instead on the internal procedures of major London
banks that had longstanding relationships with the Bank of England.
This attitude was in line with the informal regulatory framework that
had developed in the city of London when there was a cozy cartel
among the main commercial banks operating behind exchange con-
trols.76 The Bank of England’s ofﬁcial response was to formalize princi-
ples of good practice in a letter, although without including enforcement
mechanisms. However, these best practices had already been part of the
rule book at Lloyds; the problem was a failure of compliance.
Since 1974 there have been several initiatives to enhance prudential
supervision of international banking, both by disseminating best prac-
tices through the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision and by devis-
ing elaborate rules for compliance within banks themselves. These
measures have not prevented repeated rogue-trading scandals that
have arisen mainly in complex trading markets and often (but not
always) in overseas ofﬁces of large ﬁnancial institutions. The operational
risks posed by young traders who escalate losses in an effort to protect
76 Catherine R. Schenk, “The New City and the State, 1959–1971,” in The British Govern-
ment and the City of London in the Twentieth Century, ed. Ranald Michie and PhilipWilliam-
son (Cambridge, U.K., 2004).
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their reputations were clearly evident forty years ago in the very early
stages of foreign-exchange trading. This evidence suggests that institu-
tions should focus more on norms than on rules to reduce these risks.
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